Abstract-We propose an efficient protocol for secure comparison of integers when both integers are shared between two parties. Such protocols are useful for implementing secure auctions. The proposed protocol's computational complexity is roughly half the complexity of the best known efficient protocol. The efficiency of the proposed protocol stems from the removal of the XOR computation which is a time consuming operation.
The comparison protocol is again repeated to check if the new bid is greater than the current highest bid. We assume that A and B are semi-honest (or they follow the protocol) because the actions of A and B can be checked after the auctions have completed. The proposed protocol is a modification of the most efficient known protocol of [1, 2] . Our contributions are: The main reason why the protocol of [1] is computationally complex is because the computation of X⊕Y with shares of bits of X and Y requires 2l encryptions and 2l decryptions, where l is the number of bits in X or Y. The reason why X⊕Y is needed for comparison is to find out which bits of X and Y are the same. We achieve this by simply computing the difference, D, between the individual bits of X and Y. The digits of D can therefore be 0, 1, or -1. To check if a given subset of digits of D, are 0, we check if the sum of the products of the digits of that subset and consecutive powers of 2 is 0. Note that if a subset of digits of D are all 0 then the corresponding bits of X and Y are equal. Related work: Secure comparison protocols have been implemented using Yao's garbled circuits [3] , using encryption of bits as quadratic and non-quadratic residues modulo an RSA modulus [4] , homomorphic encryption R. S. Katti is with North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND 58108 USA (phone: 701-231-7369; fax: 701-231-8677; e-mail: rajendra.katti@ ndsu.edu).
C. Ababei is with North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND 58108 USA (e-mail: cristinel.Ababei@ndsu.edu). [1, 2, 5] , and other adhoc techniques [6, 7] . The most efficient amongst these is the protocol of [1] because it makes use of a smaller plaintext space for the encryption scheme. We use the same encryption scheme of [1] and describe it next. Homomorphic encryption: To generate the keys for encryption, parameters k, t, and l are defined such that k > t > l. k is the number of bits in an RSA modulus n, such that n = pq, where p and q are primes. u and v p , and v q are another set of primes that are chosen such that v p | (p-1) and v q | (q-1) [2] . u has at least l+2 bits and v = v p v q has at least t bits. The shares of X and Y are in Z u . We choose random elements ݃, ݄ ∈ ܼ * such that the multiplicative order of h is v = v p v q and g has order uv. The public key is now pk = (n, g, h, u) and the secret key is sk = (p, q, v p , v q ). The plaintext space is Z u and the ciphertext space is ܼ * . To encrypt a message m ∈ Z u , we choose a random 2t-bit integer r, to obtain the ciphertext c, as follows, ‫ܧ‬ ሺ݉, ‫ݎ‬ሻ ൌ ݃ ݄ ‫݀݉‬ ݊. The decryption of c can be done as follows,
Since g v has order uv and u is very small, one can build a table containing values of ݃ ௩ mod n and corresponding values of m. In our protocol we just need to check if c encrypts the message 0. This can easily be done by checking if c v mod n = 1. The following equations make the above encryption scheme homomorphic. 2. B chooses r ∈ Z u and computes E pk (p A q B -r mod u) using the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme and sends it to A. 3. A decrypts the received encryption to get p A q B -r. Therefore the shares of p A q B are (p A q B -r, r). p B q A can be similarly computed and hence p⊕q.
II. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
We present a method that eliminates the computation of x i ⊕y i in step 1 of Protocol 1. This reduces the complexity of Protocol 1 by half. Our protocol is given below. , it follows that w ≠ 0 if any of its digits is nonzero. Therefore all the digits ݀ must be 0 for w to be 0.
Remark: The largest power of 2 used in step 2 of Protocol 3 is 2 l-1 . Since u has l+2 bits it is always greater than 2 l-1 . 
III. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a protocol for comparison of two integers, X and Y, when two parties A and B have additive shares of X and Y. Our protocol has half the computational complexity of the most efficient known protocol of [1] . Our protocol achieves efficiency by eliminating the computation of XOR which is a time consuming task. The communication complexity of our protocol is the same as the protocol of [1] . The proof of security of our protocol when A and B are semihonest consists of a simulator that is given the inputs and outputs of the corrupted party and produces messages that are identically distributed to the messages it receives in a real run of the protocol.
